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Improving Technology Neutrality
Through Compulsory Licensing
Jake Linford†
In Rethinking Technology Neutrality,1 Brad Greenberg
raises the provocative possibility that the principle of
technology neutrality embedded in the Copyright Act of 1976
aims at worthwhile goals, but actually stymies the achievement
of those objectives. Greenberg posits that technology
neutrality’s laudable dual purposes of future-proofing the
Copyright Act and promoting equivalent treatment of old and
new technologies vis-à-vis copyright liability are thwarted by
four heretofore under-recognized problems. First, it is difficult
to predict the costs of subjecting new tech to old copyright laws.
Second, innovators face an unclear penumbra of protection that
increases precisely because Congress will mistakenly assume
tech neutral laws need no updating. Third, so-called neutral
application likely varies depending on the perspective and
approach of the judges that construe relevant statutory
language. Fourth, technology neutrality may be little more
than a pretense because so-called “neutrality” favors
incumbents over innovators.
Greenberg argues that Congress should replace the
expansive scope of technology neutrality with a broad right to
economic exploitation of a copyrighted work in a variety of
specific technology categories, which would improve technology
tailoring of copyright law. As part of that change, Greenberg
imagines an increased role for an administrative agency in
updating the scope of copyright law. In addition, Greenberg’s
reimagined copyright act would require a compulsory license
for new technologies that do not fit within a specific technology
category—a mandated midpoint between no-liability fair use
and the business-ending injunctive relief that often
† Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University. Copyright ©
2016 by Jake Linford.
1. Brad A. Greenberg, Rethinking Technology Neutrality, 100 MINN. L.
REV. 1495 (2016).
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accompanies a property right.2
Even if Congress could be motivated to enact Greenberg’s
proposed changes, this shift to technology specificity and
technological discrimination would not solve the identified
problems as completely as he hopes. But his article points a
way forward: courts can become more aware of the problems of
technology neutrality and confront them more directly when
assessing the scope of copyright protection against
unauthorized uses via new technological interventions. Doing
so may mitigate the current tendency to make every copyright
lawsuit a fight about the transformative and disruptive nature
of the technology at issue. In addition, when a useful new
technology exploits copyrighted expression, courts might
properly avoid the extremes of injunctive relief or no liability
and instead award remedies like Greenberg’s compulsory
license.
I. RETHINKING TECHNOLOGY NEUTRALITY
Technology neutrality, simply stated, is an approach that
regulates behavior rather than technology.3 In the context of
the Copyright Act of 1976, technology neutrality is most clearly
embodied in section 102(a),4 which states that copyright
subsists in “any tangible medium of expression, now known or
later developed.”5 Technology neutrality also manifests in many
of the Act’s definitions,6 and in the rights granted to copyright

2. Cf. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty
Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2009 (2007) (“In the real world, it is common
for patent defendants to settle cases for more money than the patentee could
have won in damages and license fees, simply to avoid the threat of an
injunction shutting down the core product.”); Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1, 31 (2002) (“[T]he fair use
doctrine in copyright law reduces the usual property rule protection to zero
order liability protection where the use of the copyright entitlement
constitutes a ‘fair use.’”).
3. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1521.
4. Id. at 1515.
5. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
6. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1515. See e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“To
‘perform’ a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly
or by means of any device or process . . . ..”). See also Copyright Law Revision:
Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6381, and H.R. 6835 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 32–33 (1965) (noting that the Act adopts
technology neutral definitions to avoid “confining the scope of an author’s
rights on the basis of present technology”).
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owners.7 As Greenberg explains, both the text and context of
the Copyright Act suggest that Congress intended to enact
legislation that reaches infringing activity whether or not
Congress could have contemplated the technology used to
infringe when it drafted the statute.8
Technology neutrality is often touted as good policy.9
Advocates of technology neutrality in copyright law emphasize
that a technology neutral statute should be somewhat future
proof—adaptable to new technologies even if the enacting
Congress couldn’t hazard a guess at what those technologies
might be. Congress thus seems to have collectively presumed
that a technology neutral statute would need less frequent
updating than a technology specific statute.10 In addition, a
technology neutral statute should be applied evenly to
equivalent technologies (or perhaps across the board to all
technologies). Even-handed application seems, at least on the
surface, more equitable than other options.
But Greenberg takes a deep look at technology neutrality
as it operates in the Copyright Act and does not like what he
sees. In fact, Greenberg proposes that future proofing might not
always be desirable.11 A future proof statute sets a normative
baseline, but norms can shift. If current norms have moved
away from the norms embodied in the statute, then technology
neutrality may cause a problematic normative lock-in.
In addition, Greenberg argues that true technology
neutrality might be unobtainable for four interlocking reasons.
First, a technology neutral regime commits to treat new
7. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1515. See e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at
63 (1976) (explaining how the author’s exclusive right, under 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(4), to perform or transmit a work publicly, can occur by means of devices
“not yet in use or even invented”).
8. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1514–18. See also e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 941476, at 52 (1976) (noting that technology neutrality was adopted to “avoid the
artificial and largely unjustifiable distinctions . . . under which statutory
copyrightability in certain cases has been made to depend upon the form or
medium in which the work is fixed”); id. at 53 (explaining that if the work of
authorship is a “literary work,” the copies or phonorecords could take any
form, “including books, periodicals, computer punch cards, microfilm, tape
recordings, and so forth”).
9. Carys J. Craig, Technological Neutrality: (Pre)Serving the Purposes of
Copyright Law, in THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY: HOW THE SUPREME COURT OF
CANADA SHOOK THE FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT 271, 272–73
(Geist ed., 2013) (summarizing arguments in favor of technology neutrality).
10. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
11. See Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1523.
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technologies as subject to copyright even though Congress
likely fails to predict the cost of extending protection in this
way. Technology neutrality may cause courts to treat
substantively different technologies as alike, even though new
technologies might be less analogous to old technologies than
they initially appear. For example, a new technology might
impose lower costs on copyright owners and provide greater
benefits to consumers than older technologies it resembles.12
Indeed, copyright owners are often criticized for shortsightedness in opposing the use of copyrighted works in new
technologies.13 Applying copyright liability to a new technology
might therefore impose a higher-than-predicted cost on
innovators and consumers.14
Second, a technology neutral regime has fuzzy
boundaries—a penumbra where interpretation is most difficult
because it is unclear whether the law should apply.15 For
technology neutral laws, the fuzzy part of the boundary may be
particularly broad. But because technology neutrality
supposedly prevents the need for frequent updating,
technologists and copyright owners may spend too long
litigating cases in the twilight of the Copyright Act’s useful
life.16
Third, technology neutrality may be in the eye of the
beholder. Greenberg observes courts often replace the
technology neutral framework that Congress enacted with a
technology specific calculus. For instance, while Napster,
Aimster, and Grokster all provided users with the means to
download music without paying copyright owners, courts
looked beyond the similarities in those systems and found
different bases for liability, in part because differences in
design persuaded the courts that different legal doctrines must
apply.17 The breadth of technology neutrality may thus leave
parties in the uncomfortable position of not knowing how a case
12. Id. at 1510, 1523.
13. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Story of Sony v. Universal Studios: Mary
Poppins Meets the Boston Strangler, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 358,
383 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss eds., 2006) (despite opposing
the Sony Betamax, “the motion picture industry grew to rely on the prerecorded videocassette market as a significant source of its income”).
14. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1524–29, 1546.
15. Id. at 1529 (citing H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law
and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607–08 (1958)).
16. Id. at 1529–36.
17. Id. at 1540–42.
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will turn out because the outcome will often depend on the
perspective of the members of the court, and their sometimes
disparate approaches when analogizing new technologies to
old.18
Fourth, if one thinks of neutrality as providing equal
opportunities for business models built on new and old
technologies to make productive use of copyrighted expression,
neutrality may only be a pretense. Technology neutrality is not
value neutral; the presumption that copyright should extend to
new business models may overprotect incumbent business
models built on old technology, discriminate against new
technology, and prevent useful competition by new entrants.19
If Greenberg is correct, true technology neutrality is
effectively unobtainable. And when technology neutrality fails,
interested parties successfully petition Congress for technology
specific provisions that undermine the technology neutral
framework on which our copyright laws supposedly depend.
Those technology specific provisions are often thorny and
impenetrable, helpful only to the interested parties who lobbied
for them, and useless for updating the law.20 So technology
neutrality is likely to fail, and its failure is likely to produce the
worst possible instances of technology specificity.
Given the flaws Greenberg perceives with technology
neutrality, he proposes that we abandon the formalism of
technology neutrality in order to receive the benefits it purports
to give us. To that end, he argues that Congress should rewrite
the Copyright Act with an eye toward a form of technology
specificity he calls technological discrimination.21 Greenberg’s
technological discrimination is a hybrid between technology
neutrality and technology specificity, which he sees as
antipodal extremes at the ends of a spectrum of policy options.
Instead of granting exclusive rights to authors to copy,
distribute, adapt, and publicly perform and display copyrighted
works in any medium or through any technology,22 Greenberg
envisions a revised copyright act that would grant an “exclusive
18. Id. at 1536–43.
19. Id. at 1543–46.
20. Id. at 1516 (discussing 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2012), a compulsory license for
cable retransmission that is available only to technologies that fit within its
narrow definitions).
21. Id. at 1548.
22. Those are the exclusive rights currently extended to copyright owners.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
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right to exploitation of the copyrighted work in [specific]
covered technologies.”23 Covered technologies would be those
substantively equivalent to technologies in defined statutory
categories. For example, the proposed revision would protect a
right to exploit the work using technology substantively
equivalent to devices currently used “for recording audiovisual
works, like video cassette recorders or cameras”; or “devices for
communicating audiovisual works to the public, like broadcast
or cable transmission technologies.”24 This technological
discrimination approach would encourage courts to consider the
costs and benefits of extending the scope of copyright protection
to new technologies.
In addition, Congress would task administrative experts
with determining whether or not a new, potentially infringing
technology is equivalent to a defined technological category.
Greenberg imagines that in many cases, copyright protection
would extend to the new technology. Furthermore, in most
cases where a new technology doesn’t fit into a specified
category, the technologist would pay a compulsory license, set
by the same administrative agency. This license would provide
a revenue stream to an injured copyright owner, but forestall
the owner from shutting down a new technology or demanding
its preferred licensing rate. Greenberg posits these changes
would improve technology tailoring in copyright law.
Greenberg is mostly right. Technology neutrality has
significant limitations, and courts should directly confront
them when resolving disputes over alleged infringement
enabled by new technology. But unfortunately, even if Congress
could be persuaded to enact the aforementioned proposals,
moving to a more technology specific copyright act would fail to
correct many of the problems that Greenberg attributes to
technology neutrality. However, as this response argues briefly
below, courts could be bolder in applying something like
Greenberg’s compulsory license at the remedies phase.
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH TECHNOLOGY SPECIFICITY
This Part summarizes Greenberg’s important insights
about four critical problems with technology neutrality—
prediction,
penumbra,
perspective,
and
pretense.
Unfortunately,
Greenberg’s
proposed
technological
23. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1549.
24. Id.
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discrimination regime would not mitigate these problems as
effectively as he hopes. Greenberg is correct that Congress
struggles to predict the cost of treating new technologies like
existing technology. But a statutory shift from behavior-based
exclusive rights regardless of technology to a general right of
economic exploitation in narrow technological categories
threatens to preserve the technological mindset embedded in
the Act without correcting the mismatch between technological
similarity and technological cost.
His proposal similarly trades the problem of penumbra—
fuzziness at the edge of the statutory boundary—for a plethora
of penumbrae. Providing narrow technology-based protections
may encourage subsequent redrafting by Congress, but courts
will face difficult interpretive challenges when comparing a
new technology to multiple potentially relevant technology
categories irrespective of how often Congress updates them.
Likewise, Greenberg notes that judicial decisions
frequently turn on whether the court focuses on the structure of
the allegedly infringing technology, or its output. The proposed
statutory fix doesn’t directly address this problem of
perspective. It merely shifts the costs from courts to Congress
or administrators.
Finally, Greenberg correctly identifies that technology
neutrality is not value neutral. Indeed, treating new technology
like old technology may discriminate against subsequent
innovations. But this deliberate policy choice is not a pretense;
neutral applicability of the statute to old and new technology is
consistent with Congressional intent, and within the scope of
the legislature’s constitutional authority as the Supreme Court
defines it.
A. PREDICTION AND THE “TECHNOLOGICAL MINDSET”
As Greenberg reminds us, experts are terrible at predicting
the next big thing.25 For example, the Internet has proven to be
a transformative communications technology, but it was first
envisioned as a way to remotely share processing power from
idle computers.26 Congress is likely much less capable of
correctly predicting the future. The difficulty of prediction
motivates technology neutrality. A technology neutral statute
25. Id. at 1525.
26. See, e.g., MICHAEL BANKS, ON THE WAY TO THE WEB: THE SECRET
HISTORY OF THE INTERNET AND ITS FOUNDERS 181 (2012).
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is drafted broadly because it is hard to imagine what the next
generation of technologies might look like. The current
Copyright Act deals with the predictive failure by not dealing
with it. Instead, the Act is presumed to govern uses of the
copyrighted work in new technologies, “whether now known or
later developed.”27
But Greenberg notes a second level of predictive failure.
Congress is like the farmer who can imagine a sharper plow—a
linear development from known technology—but not a
technological discontinuity like the combustion engine.28 The
Internet is another technological discontinuity likely
unimaginable when the Copyright Act of 1976 was drafted and
enacted. The printing (or pressing) and distribution of bootleg
books or vinyl albums is not analogous to how information is
transmitted and used over the Internet; neither is a radio or
television broadcast. Greenberg thus observes that Congress is
not only incapable of predicting what technologies are beyond
the horizon, but it cannot know whether applying copyright law
to these new technologies “will promote—or undermine—the
law’s policy goals.”29 A technology specific Copyright Act might
ameliorate that limitation by requiring more frequent
updating, which could encourage or even require Congress to
consider these questions on a more regular basis.30
Indeed, Greenberg locates some of the problem of
prediction in the exclusive 106 rights themselves.31 Exclusive
rights to copy, adapt, distribute, and publicly perform and
display a copyrighted work presume technologically specific
boundaries between the rights. But new technologies collapse
the borders between rights.32 And litigating one of the 106
27. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
28. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1527.
29. Id. at 1526.
30. See, e.g., Hon. M. Margaret McKeown, Happy Birthday Statute of
Anne: The Dance Between the Courts and Congress, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1145, 1152–53 (2010) (describing how narrow judicial opinions may prompt
Congress to update the Copyright Act). Congress, however, will sometimes
defer to the courts on just these types of questions. For example, Congress
contemplated revising the Copyright Act to legalize home video recording, but
instead waited for the Supreme Court’s opinion in Sony v. Universal. Litman,
supra note 13, at 365–66 (citing H.R. 5488, 97th Cong. (1982); S. Amdt. 1242
to S. 1758, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 5705, 97th Cong. (1982); S. Amdt. 1333 to
S. 1758, 97th Cong. (1982)).
31. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1528.
32. Id. (quoting United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and
Publishers, 627 F.3d 64, 74 n.10 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[U]nder certain circumstances
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rights without discussing any of the others might “invite[]
technological manipulation designed to skirt liability while
engaging in practices that do not conform to the spirit of the
law.”33 This “technological mindset,” anchoring the technology
neutrality in the current act to old technologies, threatens to
leave infringement through “substantively equivalent
technologies and business models” unremedied.34
Unfortunately, Greenberg’s proposed statutory revision—
protecting the right of copyright owners to economic
exploitation of the work in covered technologies—does not move
copyright law away from the technological mindset. Indeed,
explicitly anchoring scope of protection to narrowly defined
technology categories may embed the technological mindset
more deeply into the copyright regime. In addition, building a
regime that relies on frequent updating will likely increase the
risk faced by copyright holders who may find themselves
waiting on an administrative agency for confirmation that they
have a right deserving a remedy.35
B. A PLETHORA OF PENUMBRAE
Greenberg also explains how technology neutrality can
exacerbate a different sort of interpretive problem. H.L.A. Hart
offered a famous hypothetical illustrating the difficulty of
construing statutory language: how should one interpret the
term “vehicles” in a statute, “no vehicles in the park.”
Construing the term broadly might ban ambulances, which one
might prefer to enter the park, at least during emergencies;36 or
baby strollers, which might not have fallen within legislative
intent, but might nevertheless count as vehicles.37 The
difficulty with narrowing the definition is that the simple
statutory language provides no hints for how to do so. The
interpreter must turn to other information, including intuitions
about what vehicle might mean, historical context of the park
. . . a transmission could constitute both a stream and a download, each of
which implicates a different right of the copyright holder.”)).
33. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1529.
34. Id. at 1528.
35. Cf. Jake Linford, A Second Look at the Right of First Publication, 58 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 585, 587 (2011) [hereinafter Linford, First
Publication] (describing how new technologies can dramatically shift risks of
infringement and enable market-decimating exploitation of copyrighted
expression).
36. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1529–30.
37. Id. at 1530.
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and “vehicle” use therein, and legislative history.
Hart posited that interpretive questions are most difficult
at the penumbra—those cases where the connection between
the term of art (“vehicle”) and the regulated thing or behavior
(strollers) are not so tenuous as to be easily dismissed, but not
so clear as to be readily embraced. Greenberg argues that
technology neutrality exacerbates this problem because the
penumbra around technology neutral language expands as the
law ages.38 He posits this expansion occurs for two reasons. I
address them here in reverse order. First, technology neutral
drafting creates the illusion that the law can survive with less
frequent updates. Greenberg posits this illusion of adaptability
will lead to ossification, because legislators mistakenly
conclude the law is relatively future-proof. Thus, corrections
will happen in a piecemeal fashion, rather than holistically.39 A
technology specific statute might prevent some ossification
because Congress cannot be easily persuaded that a technology
specific statute can carry on without frequent updating.40
Second, compared to a technology specific provision, a
technology neutral law must speak in broad generalities. A
general statute like “no vehicles in the park” must be
reinterpreted as new vehicle-like technologies like the Segway
or the drone are invented. Statutory interpretation in the
penumbra is difficult and prone to error. Greenberg argues that
a technology specific statute, like “no skateboards in the park,”
provides more clarity about its intended boundaries, potentially
reducing the scope of the penumbra.41
The problem of the penumbra presented itself in the recent
litigation over the Aereo business model. Aereo retransmitted
broadcast television signals to customers, a business model
that looks much like the cable model that Congress subjected to
a compulsory license.42 But Aereo sought to work around
copyright liability by using a bank of tiny antennae to capture
individual signals for individual subscribers. The redundancy

38. Id.
39. Id. at 1531.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1530.
42. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2012). Under that compulsory license, the owners of
copyright cannot prohibit cable operators from retransmitting on-the-air
broadcasts, but the cable operators must observe certain formalities and pay a
government specified royalty.
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was designed to circumvent the public performance right.43
When broadcasters sued to block Aereo, courts struggled with
broad definitions of “the public” and “transmission” in the
Copyright Act. Greenberg argues that new technologies like
Aereo’s antenna bank “enlarge the area of uncertainty by
creating questions that legislators did not imagine were
technologically possible.”44
Greenberg worries that in a technology neutral regime, the
penumbra will expand as technology develops, but technology
specific statutes are not immune to this pressure. Returning to
his example of “no skateboards in the park,” consider whether a
Segway is close enough to a skateboard to fit within its
penumbra, or whether something like the Hoverboard from
Back to the Future counts as a skateboard.45 Likewise, instead
of deciding whether a technology infringes the exclusive right
to make copies, courts would be tasked with deciding whether a
new technology is similar enough to one of several defined
technological categories that its use of a copyrighted work
infringes the owner’s exclusive right to economic exploitation.
Indeed, technology specificity may replace one penumbra with
a plethora of penumbrae. Instead of dealing with a large band
of uncertainty around technology neutral provisions, courts will
be tasked with understanding gaps between specific technology
categories and determining whether a new technology maps
onto one category or another. In both cases, courts are on the
horns of the same dilemma: does the current statute cover the
new technology? Thus, technology specific statutes do not solve
the problem of penumbra.
C. PERCEPTIONS OF PERSPECTIVE
Greenberg returns to the Aereo case to highlight what he
calls the problem of perspective: when a court considers a
technology deep within the penumbra, one that Congress could
not have predicted, the perspective of the court about the
technology may take an oversized role. Courts might look to the
structure or operation of new technology, or they might look to
the output or commercial function of the technology. Those
43. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014); Greenberg,
supra note 1 at 1530–31.
44. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1531.
45. BACK TO THE FUTURE PART II (Universal Pictures 1989). One company
now offers a hoverboard that will hover an inch off the ground. See HENDO
HOVER, http://www.hendohover.com (last visited Aug. 8, 2016).
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distinctly different frames of reference can drive litigation
outcomes.46
For example, in Aereo, a majority of justices joined Justice
Breyer in concluding that Aereo infringed the public
performance right in the copyrighted works it retransmitted. In
so concluding, Justice Breyer looked past the structure of the
antenna set up, concluding that Aereo had the same
“commercial objectives” as cable companies, and consumers had
effectively the same experience as cable customers.47 From
Justice Breyer’s perspective, the output of the Aereo system
was just like the output of a cable system. Thus, the Copyright
Act applied to Aereo’s transmission.
Justice Scalia saw things differently. His dissenting
opinion took a structural perspective. The structure of the
antenna system, with each subscriber receiving a signal from
an assigned antenna, moved Aereo out of a public performance,
because the transmission was one-to-one. This structural
perspective led Scalia to conclude that consumers, rather than
Aereo, transmitted the performance.48
Greenberg argues that the Act’s technology neutrality
makes the distinction between structure and output too
important. Greenberg amasses significant evidence that
Congress likely intended courts to apply a behaviorist, outputfocused perspective, although the statutory language does not
explicitly address the issue of perspective.49 But he
acknowledges that while more specificity about the proper
frame of reference could mitigate the problem of perspective,
the problem would persist.50
In addition, Greenberg perceives the 106 rights as
contributing to the problem of perspective. Those rights—
copying, creating derivative works, distributing copies, and
performing and displaying publicly—embed a thencontemporary understanding of how authors and owners might
exploit their copyright. Gaps in coverage between 106 rights
become apparent as new technologies arise because those 106
rights are anchored in old technologies. Aereo’s exploited new
technology and an old understanding of signal reception to
46. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1537.
47. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2508.
48. Id. at 2514 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In sum, Aereo does not ‘perform’
for the sole and simple reason that it does not make the choice of content.”).
49. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1542.
50. Id.
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build a business model that skirted the edges of copying and
performance, fitting squarely into neither concept and thus
potentially infringing neither right.51
Unfortunately, replacing a technology neutral inquiry into
infringing activities with a technology specific inquiry into
whether the defendant infringes an exclusive right to “economic
exploitation” of a covered technology or its close equivalents
doesn’t cleanly solve this problem. The problem of perspective
would persist in a technology specific statutory regime as well.
Questions of structure versus output would linger. A statute
that secures the right to economic exploitation in a covered
category like devices for recording audiovisual works such as
video recorders or cameras, would still leave courts with a
choice between a structural inspection of the internal workings
of the new technology and a behavioral examination of the
allegedly infringing output. And Greenberg’s proposed revision,
which extends exclusive rights to exploit the copyrighted work
in covered technologies and those “substantially equivalent” to
those covered,52 provides no guidance on whether to apply a
structural or behavioral perspective in discerning substantial
equivalence.
D. PRETENSE AND PHRASEOLOGY
Greenberg’s final problem with technology neutrality is
that its neutrality may be a pretense. Technology neutrality is
shaped by social and political context, and requires a decision
in the first instance about which technologies and rights set the
purportedly neutral baseline. Extending copyright law to new
technologies is thus not a value neutral proposition. Setting
any statutory baseline requires making value judgments as
part of that process. Nevertheless, while it is crucial to
recognize the values baked into technology neutrality, those
determinations do not strip technology neutrality of its equal
application.
Greenberg is correct to highlight the mismatch between
value neutrality and technology neutrality, but to presume
value neutrality from technology neutrality is the fundamental
error. As Greenberg’s summary of the legislative history
explains, Congress intended to make a broadly applicable
copyright law that would reach new technology. The decision is
51. Id. at 1538–39.
52. Id. at 1549.
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not value neutral, but it is neutral in the sense that it applies
equally to every technology, if that technology is used to
infringe one of the exclusive rights granted to the copyright
owner. This neutral applicability was not accidental, although
there are public policy reasons to wonder whether the choice
was well-taken.53
In addition, a counter-factual regime in which Congress
eschewed neutral applicability would be equally value laden,
and likely aimed at a different goal than the goal animating the
technology neutral provisions of the 1976 Act. If copyright
owners were required to petition Congress or an agency to
reach any new infringing technology, the law would
discriminate against IP owners, against standing business
models, and against prior technologists who may have paid to
play.54
More generally, it is not clear that Greenberg’s critique is
specific to technology neutrality. It rather aims at a prior
question—what is the scope of Congress’s authority to set
copyright law’s policy goals? If, as Greenberg teaches us,
Congress intended to draft an act that takes as its default
extending copyright protection to reach infringing activity
implemented through new technology, then technology
neutrality may promote the goal. At a minimum, it may not be
an unintended consequence.55
Should Congress be empowered to decide which policy
goals to aim for with the scope of copyright protection? The
Supreme Court deflected two recent challenges to
Congressional authority to extend the duration of copyright

53. See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright
Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1589–91 (2009) (arguing that content
owners “clearly are not best positioned to develop” new markets for existing
works); Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1545 (arguing that “technology neutrality
entangles granting authors exclusive control over exploitation of their work
with protecting existing markets from new markets of exploitation [which]
imposes social costs without necessarily conferring benefits to authors”).
54. Linford, First Publication, supra note 35, at 623 (observing that a
policy of denying rights incidental to those rights that directly incentivized the
creation of copyrightable expression would “at its extreme . . . lead to a string
of property rights derived from the same underlying creative act scattered
among successive technological innovators”).
55. Id. at 629–32 (explaining how Congress imported from the common
law right of first publication—and the Court affirmed—a right of market entry
broad enough to allow a copyright owner to decide if and when to have its
work exploited in a given medium).
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protection,56 and to the renewal of protection to copyrighted
works for which protection had expired due to a failure to
observe formalities, among other reasons.57 Scholars have
argued there should be some limit on Congressional authority
in these contexts.58 But the Supreme Court has articulated only
three limits on copyright protection that Congress may not
alter: the idea-expression line that bars extending copyright
protection to ideas;59 protection from liability for fair uses;60
and eventual expiration of copyright protection.61 Technology
neutrality’s purported problem of pretense crosses none of
those impermeable thresholds. Greenberg provides a strong
argument for why we could construe technology neutrality as
bad policy, but not as constitutionally impermissible. Congress
is allowed to select a statutory regime, even if it is
unfortunately short-sighted.62
D. TAKEAWAYS
What should we take from Greenberg’s description of the
56. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003) (“Beneath the facade of
their inventive constitutional interpretation, petitioners forcefully urge that
Congress pursued very bad policy in prescribing the CTEA’s long terms. The
wisdom of Congress’ action, however, is not within our province to secondguess.”).
57. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878 (2012) (“Neither the Copyright
and Patent Clause nor the First Amendment, we hold, makes the public
domain, in any and all cases, a territory that works may never exit.”).
58. See, e.g., Jake Linford, The Institutional Progress Clause, 16 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 533, 559 (2014) [hereinafter Linford, Progress Clause].
59. Id. at 559 (“[T]he Progress Clause builds in a natural limit recognized
by the courts, as articulated in the idea-expression dichotomy.”).
60. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219–20 (2003) (“[C]opyright law contains built-in
First Amendment accommodations” allowing free use of ideas and providing a
fair use defense, which “affords considerable ‘latitude for scholarship and
comment’”) (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 560 (1985)). Cf. Neil Weinstock Netanel, First Amendment
Constraints on Copyright After Golan v. Holder, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1082, 1103
(2013) (arguing that although the opinion in Golan narrowly defines the
traditional contours of copyright protection, it nevertheless “fortifies and gives
First Amendment import to the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use
defense”).
61. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37
(2003) (noting that Congress may not “create[] a species of perpetual patent
[or] copyright”).
62. Jessica W. Rice, Note, “The Devil Take the Hindmost”: Copyright’s
Freedom from Constitutional Constraints After Golan v. Holder, 161 U. PA. L.
REV. ONLINE 283, 298–300 (2013) (stating Golan “has issued so broad a license
to Congress that ostensibly there remain no principled constitutional
safeguards against the public domain’s continued erosion”).
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problems of technology neutrality? First, these problems are a
subset of a problem courts face in almost every case, whether
the law to be applied is common law or statutory. Courts must
reason by analogy, for instance, in determining whether Aereo’s
use of copyrighted works is like the use made by cable
companies, or like the use of a photocopy machine. And of
course, when a court faces a new technology, decisions made by
the Supreme Court in Aereo will be among the inputs that help
the court determine whether copyright protection reaches uses
of a work by the new technology (whether that technology is
cloud computing or something else). The common law process of
reasoning by analogy may or may not lead to efficient outcomes
in the long run.63 But it is an established part of the American
legal system.
Second, technology neutrality might lead Congress to think
it need not amend the Copyright Act, perhaps because it
assumes courts can reason by analogy as well in these
technological contexts as in many others. Here, Greenberg
weakens his own narrative by noting the frequency with which
IP-creating industries have successfully obtained technology
specific provisions.64 Those technology specific provisions,
however, are often challenging to comprehend, and so narrowly
tailored that even if they were comprehensible, they provide
almost no guidance in determining liability for infringement
through subsequent technological innovations. One might
therefore reasonably question the benefit of more frequent
updating.
In addition, Greenberg is aware of the easiest criticism of
his proposed statutory reform: Congress can be difficult to
motivate at the best of times, and right now, copyright reform
is toxic.65 The last attempt by copyright owners to expand the
scope of protection was met with significant public hostility.66
63. Compare e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW
(7th ed. 2007) (proposing that the common law is efficient), with DAVID A.
FRIEDMAN, LAW’S ORDER 298–99 (2000) (questioning that claim).
64. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1520.
65. See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski, The Capture of International
Intellectual Property Law Through the U.S. Trade Regime, 87 S. CAL. L. REV.
977, 1045 (2014) (“Intellectual property enforcement is, [post failed reform], a
toxic topic in Washington.”); Hayden W. Gregory, The Next Great Copyright
Act?, 7 LANDSLIDE 2, 59 (2014) (“[F]or several key copyright leaders in
Congress, the recent catastrophic collapse of . . . legislation aimed at off-shore
online piracy loomed as a disincentive to taking on bold new initiatives.”).
66. Linford, Progress Clause, supra note 58, at 581 (2013) (“While the
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And while the Copyright Office has begun the process of
imagining “The Next Great Copyright Act,”67 nothing like
Greenberg’s technological discrimination regime is dreamed of
in the current slate of proposals. We are in for a long wait if we
must wait for Congress to fix the problems with technology
neutrality.
Third, Greenberg worries that the law doesn’t tailor well
because there is no institution to which the role of tailoring has
been delegated. That’s not entirely true either. For better or
worse, Congress designated itself the institution responsible for
making wholesale revisions to the Act, and that’s a role the
Supreme Court has provided wide latitude for Congress to
inhabit.68 Greenberg has a different take on proper
institutional roles—he proposes a more active role for agencies,
making judgments about whether new technology is subject to
the reach of the current version of the Act.69
Furthermore, agencies are already empowered to shape
copyright law by managing compulsory damage regimes and
crafting exceptions to liability for circumventing technological
protection measures or trafficking in technology that
circumvents those measures. From the view of some interest
groups, the process leaves much to be desired.70 But Greenberg
is correct that an administrative agency at its worse might be
quicker than Congress at its best.71 He also correctly notes
public response [against recent proposed expansions to the copyright
protection] was certainly encouraged by ISPs and intermediaries who viewed
it as a threat to the operation of the Internet, it was the public response, not
the centralized opposition, that sent legislators of all political stripes scurrying
to distance themselves from the bill.”); Annemarie Bridy, Copyright
Policymaking as Procedural Democratic Process: A Discourse-Theoretic
Perspective on ACTA, SOPA, and PIPA, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 153,
159 (2012) (detailing the public outcry in response to those proposed
expansions).
67. Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 315 (2013).
68. See supra notes 56–60 and accompanying text. See also Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984) (“It may well be
that Congress will take a fresh look at this new technology, just as it so often
has examined other innovations in the past. But it is not our job to apply laws
that have not yet been written.”).
69. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1550, 1553–55.
70. See, e.g., Statement of Maria A. Pallante, U.S. Register of Copyrights
and Dir. of the U.S. Copyright Office, before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
The Register’s Perspective on Copyright Review, 1, 21 (Apr. 29, 2015),
http://copyright.gov/laws/testimonies/042915-testimony-pallante.pdf.
71. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1558.
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Congress is subject to similar capture risk as an agency.72
III. MITIGATING THE PROBLEMS OF TECHNOLOGY
NEUTRALITY
It may be possible, however, for courts to mitigate the
problems with the current technology neutral regime in two
ways. First, Greenberg’s framework can guide a more direct
look at the intended scope of the Act when courts consider
alleged infringement through new technology. For example,
consider again the Aereo opinion. Justice Breyer and Justice
Scalia did not appear to recognize they were applying different
perceptual frames in examining the Aereo technology and
business model. A more explicit recognition of those disparate
perspectives might have improved the usefulness of that
decision as a tool for courts analyzing the next technology shift.
Second, courts mindful of the limits of technology
neutrality might craft a remedy resembling the compulsory
license that Greenberg prefers in many cases of alleged
infringement via new technologies.73 As prescribed by the
Copyright Act, infringement may be remedied with temporary
or permanent injunctive relief,74 or with compensation in the
amount of the copyright owner’s actual damages,75 the
infringer’s profits,76 or statutory damages.77 In some cases, the
prevailing party may also receive costs and attorney’s fees.78
Within that framework of remedies, might a court grant a
prospective, postjudgment license?
Some commentators have argued in favor of affording
courts discretion to grant a prospective license or ongoing
royalty as an alternative to injunctive relief.79 Although not
72. In fact, sometimes agency capture is a symptom of legislative capture.
See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the
Regulation of Financial Politics: A Review Essay, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1991,
2045 (2014).
73. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1559.
74. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2012).
75. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2012).
76. Id.
77. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012).
78. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012). Courts may also order the impounding or
destruction of infringing articles, 17 U.S.C. § 503 (2012), or criminal penalties
for infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2012).
79. See, e.g., Aaron Keyt, Comment, An Improved Framework for Music
Plagiarism Litigation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 421, 459 (1988) (arguing that in some
contexts, “[c]ourts are more competent than Congress to balance such
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explicitly authorized by the current statute, it is possible that
the power to grant injunctive relief might include the lesser
power to grant a compulsory license.80 Others question whether
courts are well-suited or authorized to grant compulsory
licenses.81
As a practical matter, courts have grown more willing to
grant prospective licenses following the Supreme Court’s
decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.82 The Court in
eBay held that injunctive relief should not be granted as a
matter of course in patent infringement cases.83 Appellate
courts applying eBay have likewise required a greater showing
from copyright plaintiffs before granting injunctions.84
Post-eBay, some courts have awarded a prospective or
compulsory license against a defendant who could not be
enjoined under the eBay standard, when the defendant
signaled it would continue to infringe the intellectual property
particularized interests in deciding whether to grant a license, and to set
appropriate terms”); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use
Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1723–26 (1988) (commending compulsory
license solutions to conflicts over copyright entitlements, but noting the
difficulty courts would face administering a license).
80. Keyt, supra note 79, at 459. See also Melville B. Nimmer, Copyright
Liability for Audio Home Recording: Dispelling the Betamax Myth, 68 VA. L.
REV. 1505, 1529–32 (1982) (discussing schemes for compulsory licenses in the
context of innocent copyright infringers, and in antitrust and patent
litigation).
81. See, e.g., H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, Prospective Compensation in
Lieu of A Final Injunction in Patent and Copyright Cases, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1661, 1664–65, 1672 (2010) (arguing, despite the tendency of many
courts post-eBay to “permit the defendant to infringe the plaintiff’s patent or
copyright so long as it pays a continuing royalty” that “federal courts have no
authority to award compulsory prospective compensation . . . for postjudgment
copyright and patent infringements”); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use As Market
Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its
Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1624 (1982) (observing that “it may be
unwise to advocate judicial adoption of an alternative to fair use that asks
courts essentially to restructure markets or to set prices for the use of
copyrighted material”); Sigmund Timberg, A Modernized Fair Use Code for the
Electronic as Well as the Gutenberg Age, 75 NW. U.L. REV. 193, 241 (1980).
82. 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Mitchell G. Stockwell, Implementing eBay: New
Problems in Guiding Judicial Discretion and Enforcing Patent Rights, 88 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 747, 756 (2006) (noting the historic hostility to
compulsory licenses in patent law and a relaxation of that hostility in the
wake of eBay).
83. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
84. See, e.g., Christopher Phelps & Assocs. v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 543
(4th Cir. 2007) (applying the holding in eBay to the question of the court’s
discretion to grant injunctive relief).
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right in question.85 For example, in Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor
Corp., the Federal Circuit held that a district court may impose
a royalty on the future use of a patented invention in lieu of an
injunction.86 The court in Paice instructed district courts to give
parties time to negotiate the royalty themselves,87 but
recognized the ability of a district court to exercise its equitable
powers and calculate a royalty when the parties cannot agree.88
District courts applying the Paice approach in patent cases
frequently look to the jury’s award of prejudgment damages as
a starting point for postjudgment damages.89
I have not found a copyright case that applies the Paice
approach,90 but that approach would be appropriate when a
court is concerned that an injunction will prematurely shut
down the new technology, and equally persuaded that use of
the copyrighted expression should not go uncompensated. The
Supreme Court has never directly held that a prospective
license may be granted instead of injunctive relief in a
copyright case, but the Court has nodded repeatedly in that
direction.91 In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., a dissenting Justice Blackmun embraced the possibility of
a prospective license on the sales of the Betamax video tape
recorder.92 Ten years later, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
85. See, e.g., Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 WL 2570614,
at *6 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 5, 2006), aff’d, 536 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“As the
court has declined to issue a permanent injunction and defendant has
indicated it will continue to infringe the patents-in-suit, the court must
fashion a remedy for the continuing harm to plaintiff.”).
86. 504 F.3d 1293, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
87. Id. at 1315 & n.15.
88. Id. at 1315.
89. Mondis Tech. Ltd. v. Chimei InnoLux Corp., 822 F. Supp. 2d 639, 645–
46 (E.D. Tex. 2011). See also Bianco v. Globus Med., Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 929,
943 (E.D. Tex. 2014) (applying the Paice approach in a trade secrets case). But
see ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., No. 3:09CV620, 2011 WL 2119410, at
*14 (E.D. Va. May 23, 2011), modified, 946 F. Supp. 2d 459 (E.D. Va. 2013),
vacated 760 F.3d 1350, (Fed. Cir. 2014). (“The Court cannot envision a
reasonable, reliable way to . . . arrive at an ongoing royalty” for patent
infringement).
90. But see Gomez-Arostegui, supra note 81, at 1727 n.416 (summarizing
lower court cases that “state in obiter dicta that continuing royalties are
permissible” in copyright cases).
91. Id. at 1670–71 (summarizing the Court’s statements about using
prospective licenses to remedy ongoing copyright infringement).
92. 469 U.S. 417, 499–500 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Ninth
Circuit also contemplated a prospective license. Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 975–76 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 469 U.S. 417
(1983).
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Inc., the Court did not expressly endorse Justice Blackmun’s
suggestion, but cited with approval a Ninth Circuit opinion
that recognized a prospective royalty as a potentially
appropriate remedy.93 And in 2001, the Court stated in New
York Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini, that a continuing royalty might
be an appropriate remedy for freelance authors whose articles
were included without their permission in an electronic
database.94
Greenberg’s analysis of the limitations of technology
neutrality in the current Copyright Act provides good reason
for courts to think creatively in assessing the proper remedy for
ongoing infringement. The Paice approach—encouraging
parties to negotiate a license, but calculating one if they cannot
agree—is already used in patent cases, so it could conceivably
be applied in copyright cases as well. Indeed, in light of the four
problems that plague a technology neutral framework, the
Paice approach or something like it might be an appropriate
prudential response even in some “new technology” cases where
the court might otherwise be inclined to grant injunctive relief.
CONCLUSION
Greenberg has done important work exposing the flaws in
the Copyright Act’s current focus on technology neutrality. His
descriptions of the limitations of technology neutrality are
particularly apt. The technological discrimination regime he
proposes, however, is not well-suited to correct the problems
with technology neutrality that he identifies. But his invitation
to fully recognize the implications of technology change and to
deal more directly with problems of prediction, penumbra,
93. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994)
(noting that in some fair use cases, “the copyright owner’s interest may be
adequately protected by an award of damages for whatever infringement is
found” (citing Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988), aff’d
sub nom. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990) (ordering the district court to
calculate damages for a re-release of defendant’s movie, which incorporated
elements of plaintiff’s copyrighted story))). Cf. Wendy J. Gordon, Excuse and
Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Transaction Costs Have Always Been
Only Part of the Story, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 149, 193 (2003) (arguing
that after Acuff-Rose, a judge is “free to give the plaintiff a reasonable royalty
or other compensation,” but questioning whether a liability rule should be
encouraged).
94. 533 U.S. 483, 505–06 (2001) (affirming a judgment of infringement,
but noting that “it hardly follows . . . that an injunction . . . must issue. . . .
[C]ourts . . . may draw on numerous models for distributing copyrighted works
and remunerating authors for their distribution”).
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perspective, and pretense could improve judicial decisions in
new technology cases. Furthermore, the invitation to consider
solutions between the poles of innovation-crushing injunctions
and incentive-stripping lack of liability is a welcome and
praiseworthy addition to the literature.

